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You Don't Have to Be a Structuralist to
Hate the Supreme Court's Dignitary
Harm Election Law Casest
RICHARD

L.

HASEN*

INTRODUCTION

In his characteristically thoughtful and provocative contribution to
this symposium, The Dignity of Voters-A Dissent, Professor James A.
Gardner offers a sustained critique of a line of Supreme Court electionlaw cases recognizing "dignitary rights" of voters.' In Gardner's
crosshairs are Shaw v. Reno,2 recognizing the "unconstitutional racial
gerrymander;" Bush v. Gore,3 recognizing the right to have one's vote
counted in a recount according to uniform voting procedures; and Purcell v. Gonzalez,4 a voter-identification case in which the Court recognized a right of voters not to have their votes "cancelled out" by voter
fraud (or their "feelings" hurt by such fraud).5 Gardner argues that these
cases were wrongly decided: the cases increase election-law litigation
and create uncertainty just before or after elections, when the societal
need for certainty and finality is the highest.6 At the same time, these
dignitary rights serve no social purpose. Gardner contends that voters
voting in elections serve a public purpose akin to jurors serving on a jury
and, under this understanding, a recognition of second-order dignitary
rights is unjustifiable.7
In this brief response to Gardner's excellent article, I make two
points. First, as I explain in Part I, Gardner mistakenly explains these
t The title of this article borrows shamelessly from Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don't
Have to Be Liberal to Hate the Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1998)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's unconstitutional racial gerrymandering cases, though from a
different perspective than this article). Lowenstein in turned borrowed from the old Levy's rye
bread commercial stating that "[y]ou don't have to be Jewish to love Levy's real Jewish Rye." See
AdSlogans, The Advertising Slogan Hall of Fame-The Best in Branding, http://www.adslogans.
co.uk/hof/ad-levys.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2009); Wikipedia, Henry S. Levy and Sons, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry-S.-Levy-and-Sons (last modified May 1, 2008).
* William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
1.James A. Gardner, The Dignity of Voters-A Dissent, 64 U. MiAMi L. REV. 435 (2010).
2. 509 U.S. 630, 633-34 (1993); see Gardner, supra note 1,at 453-54.
3. 531 U.S. 98, 103, 107-110 (2000) (per curiam); see Gardner, supra note 1, at 454.
4. 532 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam); see Gardner, supra note I, at 438, 455.
5. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 458. Gardner also takes aim at and some earlier campaignfinance and one person, one vote cases. See id. at 444 n.26, 460-61.
6. See id. at 459-63.
7. See id. at 455-59.
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jurisprudential developments as the Supreme Court embracing the "individual" rights side in the "rights-structure" debate among election-law
scholars. Instead, these developments show the Court embracing a misguided structural approach to election-law cases (albeit clothed in the
language of rights). Shaw reined in what the Court majority viewed as
an out-of-control Justice Department overly interfering with state prerogatives in redistricting. Bush reined in what the Court majority viewed
as an out-of-control Florida Supreme Court overly interfering with
administrative recount procedures in the highly charged context of a
presidential election recount. Purcell reined in civil rights plaintiffs
interfering with state administrative prerogatives in setting forth the
rules for conducting elections. In each of these cases, voter "rights" were
merely a stand-in for structural concerns of the Court.
Second, as I explain in Part II, using the individual rights approach,
these cases were incorrectly decided. Under the individual rights
approach, the Court should protect only "core" equality rights that affect
the real allocation of political power among political equals in a democracy. In Shaw, the Court incorrectly protected voter rights in the districting process that had no potential to affect political power relationships.
In Bush and the voter-identification cases, the Court failed to recognize
rights on both sides of the case and that the rights of voters on (what
turned out to be) the losing side easily trumped rights on the winning
side of the case. Thus, Gardner's conclusion that these cases were
wrongly decided is absolutely correct, even using an individual rights
framework to reach this result. The Court should continue to focus on
rights in its election-law jurisprudence, but not on inchoate "dignitary"
rights that fail to affect the allocation of political power.
I.

DON'T BLAME SUPPORTERS OF THE RIGHTS APPROACH FOR
SHAW, BUSH, AND PURCELL

Gardner's article makes many fine points about which I have no
quibble. He is especially interesting and persuasive in his discussion of
political theory and the question of how to conceive of the role of the
voter in a democracy. Gardner is able to make considerable progress on
this question by viewing voters as akin to jurors engaged in public service, and this model surely has implications for other election-law questions frequently considered by scholars and courts.8 But there is one
point in Gardner's discussion with which I disagree, relating to the cause
8. For Gardner's more extended and nuanced treatment of related questions, see JAMES A.
GARDNER, WHAT ARE CAMPAIGNS FOR? THE ROLE OF PERSUASION IN ELECTORAL LAW AND
POLmCS (2009).
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of the Supreme Court's recognition of dignitary rights in these controversial cases.
Gardner locates the cause as the Supreme Court siding with certain
election-law scholars in the rights-structure debate. This is not the place
to rehash this debate, and Gardner's article cites the relevant literature
for readers unfamiliar with it.9 In Gardner's view, the Court has developed a rights fetish, and its preoccupation with its conception of rights
has blinded it to the negative effects of recognizing mere dignitary rights
in election-law cases. Gardner tells us that "[t]his is bad because the
rights-based and structural approaches frequently conflict, and the
Court's preference for a rights-based approach therefore often leads it to
decisions that are not only substantively wrong, but ultimately at war
with the requirements of a properly functioning democracy."' He concludes that
[lr]ather than approach issues involving democratic process as
problems of power or the proper functioning of a system of representative democracy, as the rights-structure critique would require, the
Court instead approaches such issues as problems of the maltreatment
of individual voters. Just as importantly, the kind of maltreatment that
counts is the kind that causes voters to experience their treatment at
the hands of the state as insulting or degrading-that is, as undignified. Thus, Shaw rights, Bush v. Gore rights, one-person-one-vote
rights, and 'anticancellation' rights all constitutionalize dignitary
rights that voters may wield, as voters, to avoid treatment that they
subjectively experience as insulting, undignified, or as relegating
them to some kind of second-class citizenship.1"
It is true that in Shaw, Bush, and Purcell, the Court majority
couched its decision in terms of individual rights. In Shaw, the Court
embraced what has come to be known as the "expressive harm" theory, 2 which finds an equal protection violation where one is forced to
live in a jurisdiction in which voters have purportedly been separated by
race for redistricting purposes without compelling justification.' 3 In
Bush, the Court accepted an argument that voters' equal protection
rights required that a jurisdiction-wide electoral recount be conducted
according to uniform standards for considering the validity of a
recounted ballot.' 4 In Purcell, a unanimous Court explained that voter
9. Gardner, supra note 1, at 435-43.
10. Id. at 441.
l1.Id. at 442-43.
12. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-DistrictAppearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
483, 506-07 (1993).
13. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993).
14. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam).
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rights could be violated when legitimate votes are cancelled out by
fraudulently cast votes or when voters "feel disenfranchised" by such

votes. '5
Nonetheless, a close reading of these cases in the context in which
they were decided shows that the Court was concerned more about the
structure and functioning of the political process than about dignitary
rights, and that the "rights talk" was really just talk. What should be
bothersome to a structuralist like Gardner then is not that the Court
applied a structuralist approach in these cases but that it applied the
wrong structuralist approach, valuing some aspects of the functioning of
our electoral system more than others.
Shaw is a good launching point for our discussion. The North Carolina legislature passed a redistricting plan that created some majorityminority electoral districts with unusual shapes.1 6 Because forty of
North Carolina's counties are covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act,' 7 a new redistricting plan could not be put into effect until the
Department of Justice "precleared" the plan upon proof from the state
that it had no discriminatory purpose or effect. 8 The DOJ took a hardline position on preclearance and insisted that the state draw as many
majority-minority districts as possible under the plan. 9 With that constraint, the state drew district lines that would create the required number
of majority-minority districts consistent with the legislature's political
goals, including incumbency protection and party interests.2 °
The plaintiffs in Shaw did not argue that their votes were "diluted"
under the North Carolina redistricting plan. Instead they made what the
Shaw Court described as an "analytically distinct claim"'" of an "uncon23
stitutional racial gerrymander. '2 2 The Court accepted this argument.
Like Gardner, most election-law scholars have rejected the wisdom and
coherence of this analytically distinct claim. As Dan Lowenstein has
persuasively argued, the Shaw case is a classic example of blaming the
victim: the Legislature, in need of preclearance from the Department of
Justice under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, really had no choice
about the number of majority-minority districts it had to draw. 4 Its only
15. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 532 U.S. 1, 3-4 (2006) (per curiam).
16. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633-36.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2006).
18. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 634.
19. Id. at 635.
20. Id. at 633-38.
21. Id. at 652.
22. Id. at 634.
23. Id. at 652.
24. Lowenstein, supra note t, at 780-95; see also id. at 804 ("Consider the statement [in
Shaw] that race 'was the criterion that, in the State's view, could not be compromised.' In the
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choice was in where to locate those districts, a choice that the Shaw line
of cases then limited significantly.
Understood as a rights case, and as explained in Part II below,
Shaw is weak. But it is more persuasively understood as a case in which
the Court attempted to affect the structure of the electoral process. To
the Shaw majority, the real problem lay in the overzealous enforcement

of the Voting Rights Act by what the Court saw as an out-of-control
Justice Department.2 5 Through a series of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering cases and voting rights cases in the 1990s, the Court ultimately reined in the Justice Department's muscular understanding of
section 5, as well as its broad understanding of the scope of section 2 of
the Act. 26 Though Dan Lowenstein is correct that the Shaw opinions
initially imposed greater limits on state authority to redistrict in contravention of federalism rights,27 states ultimately enjoyed greater freedom
as the Department of Justice had to relax its requirements for the creation of majority-minority districts taking pressure off the voting rights
side of the problem.
A similar structural story may be told for both Bush v. Gore and
Purcell. Bush v. Gore's equal protection holding has been almost universally excoriated in its reasoning." But understood structurally, it seems
pretty clear that the motivating factor of the Court was reining in the
State's view? Why could race not be compromised, 'in the State's view'? Because the members of
the North Carolina legislature were driven by ideological fervor to create a second [majorityminority district]? Of course not. The legislature had already adopted a plan containing one
[majority-minority district], but was forbidden to place it into effect by the Justice Department,
which denied it preclearance. 'Race was the criterion that, in the State's view, could not be
compromised,' for the excellent reason that the federal government prohibited the state from
compromising the racial criterion. The federal government absolutely required North Carolina to
redistrict, and the federal government absolutely prohibited North Carolina from redistricting
without creating two [majority-minority districts]. That the racial criterion 'could not be
compromised' was not a question of 'the State's view,' but an objective circumstance imposed on
North Carolina by the federal government." (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
25. This became clearer in the next case in this line, Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 924-25
(1995), in which the Court is quite dismissive of Department of Justice efforts to force a "maxblack" plan on the Georgia legislature.
26. In addition to the Shaw line of cases described in DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN ET AL.,
ELECTION LAW 217-21 (4th ed. 2008), see Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 480
(1997) (rejecting DOJ regulation requiring adherence to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act for
jurisdictions subject to preclearance under section 5's "effects" prong); Reno v. Bossier Parish
Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 330-31 (2000) (same holding under section 5's "purpose" prong); see
also Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174,
at 199-200 (2007) (explaining DOJ reliance on the purpose prong of section 5 until the second
Bossier Parish decision).
27. See Lowenstein, supra note t, at 781-83.
28. See Richard L. Hasen, A CriticalGuide to Bush v. Gore Scholarship, 7 ANN. RIV. POL.
Sci. 297, 301-04 (2004). For a rare defense of the equal protection holding, see Nelson Lund, The
UnbearableRightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219, 1220 (2002).
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Florida Supreme Court, not protecting the dignitary rights of unnamed
and unknown Florida voters. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist viewed the
Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of Florida statutes to require a
manual recount of punch-card ballots 29 as "absurd," "peculiar," and an
interpretation "no reasonable person"3 would embrace. To the Bush v.
Gore majority, too, the United States Supreme Court's "unsought
responsibility" 3' was to rein in an out-of-control Florida Supreme Court
which was making up new rules for the counting of votes to benefit Al
Gore. 32 To conservatives generally, the Florida Supreme Court was the
lawless entity changing the rules of the game after the fact to help Gore
33
get elected.
Purcell too is best understood structurally. Since the 2000 Florida
electoral meltdown culminating in the Court's opinion in Bush v. Gore,
the amount of election-law litigation has increased markedly. 34 For obvious reasons, the Supreme Court is wary of getting involved in such disputes, especially in the days leading up to the election. Purcell was a
case in which in which plaintiffs sought to block enforcement of Arizona's new voter-identification law. The Ninth Circuit reversed a federal
district court denial of a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit
enjoined enforcement of the law, and the Supreme Court, in a surprise
order on a request for a stay of the Ninth Circuit's order, granted a writ
of certiorari and issued an opinion on the merits reversing the Ninth
Circuit.3 6
Though the Court couched its language in terms of individual rights
being on both sides of the voter fraud/voter turnout question,3 7 the
upshot of the decision is to keep similar cases out of federal courts in the
days before the election. Changes in election rules in the days before an
29. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1287-91 (Fla. 2000).
30. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 119 (2000) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring).
31. Id. at Ill (per curiam).
32. As Justice Scalia told the television program 60 Minutes: "Gee, I really don't wanna get
into-I mean this is-get over it. It's so old by now. The principal issue in the case, whether the
scheme that the Florida Supreme Court had put together violated the federal Constitution, that
wasn't even close. The vote was seven to two." 60 Minutes: Justice Scalia on the Record (CBS
television broadcast Sept. 14, 2008).
33. . See Richard A. Epstein, "In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct," in
THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 13, 35 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A.
Epstein eds., 2001); Charles Fried, An UnreasonableReaction to a Reasonable Decision, in BUSH
V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGMMACY

3, 4-19 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002); Michael W.

McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, in THE VOTE, supra, at 98, 100-06,
177-22.
34. Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009)
(manuscript at 21, on file with author).
35. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 532 U.S. 1, 1, 4-5 (2006) (per curiam).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 3-4.
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election are disruptive and potentially confusing. In Purcell, the Court
not only recognized the need to balance competing interests in such
cases, leaving questions in the sound discretion of the trial court; it also
admonished courts not to change the rules at the last minute.38 The
Court in Purcell, far from being concerned with vacuous dignitary interests, appeared more interested in the smooth operation of elections,
which might explain the unanimous vote in the case despite the troubling and controversial language about such dignitary rights.
As Pam Karlan described it in discussing Shaw and Bush, the
Court's project is one of "structural equal protection" in which "[t]he
Court deploys the Equal Protection Clause not to protect the rights of an
identifiable group of individuals, particularly a group unable to protect
itself through operation of the normal political processes, but rather to
regulate the institutional arrangements within which politics is
conducted." 3 9
To say that the Supreme Court's dignitary-rights cases are really
about structuralism is not to say that the Court got it right even under its
structural approach. To use the example of Bush v. Gore again, to some
scholars the Florida Supreme Court followed the existing rules for
resolving election disputes, and it was the U.S. Supreme Court that
changed the rules midstream.4" Thus, while all structuralists can recognize a "lawlessness principle" 4 -that election disputes must be resolved
under the rules of the game as established by election day-there can be
considerable dispute over implementation of this principle in electionlaw cases.
In sum, Gardner should not be taken in by the rhetoric of Shaw,
Bush, and Purcell. In each of these cases the Court was more concerned
about the structure and functioning of the electoral system than about the
dignitary rights of voters. Gardner's article is notable for stripping the
Court of the faqade of dignitary interests, which should force the Court
to more clearly and nakedly articulate the structural interests upon which
it is relying, and in turn, allow for criticisms of those structural interests.
38. Id. at 4 ("Faced with an application to enjoin operation of voter identification procedures
just weeks before an election, the Court of Appeals was required to weigh, in addition to the
harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election
cases and its own institutional procedures. Court orders affecting elections, especially conflicting

orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the
polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.").
39. Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal:The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protectionfrom
Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1345, 1346 (2001) (footnote omitted).
40. Akhil Reed Amar, Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution, 61 FLA. L. REv. 945, 946
(2009).
41. Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Lawlessness Principle:A Comment on Professor
Amar, 61 FLA. L. REv. 979, 980 (2009).
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AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS CRITIQUE OF SHAW, BUSH, AND PURCELL

As someone who has been associated with the individual rights
position in the rights-structure debate, I find little to commend from an
individual rights perspective in Shaw, Bush, and Purcell. As I have
explained in great detail elsewhere, courts (and especially the Supreme
Court) should be cautious in protecting individual rights because broad
pronouncements of rights have the potential to ossify the political process and lead to unintended consequences that hurt political participation.4 2 Accordingly, courts should protect only core equality rights,
leaving peripheral concerns to the political processes themselves.
Under these principles, the dignitary rights cases were wrongly
decided. Consider Shaw:
Taking race into account in districting violates no core equality principle. It denies no one essential political rights; it does not violate the
antiplutocracy principle by taking wealth or property ownership into
account; and it violates no collective action principle. It does not even
violate any contested political equality principle that the Court might
recognize. In short, though the Shaw Court used the label of equal
protection, there does not appear to be any political equality problem
at issue in these cases. Even when the government 'sends a message
with its conduct' in a political equality case, we should view that
message as irrelevant if it has no bearing on real political power
relationships. 43
As for Bush and Purcell, both cases have the same objectionable
feature: in recognizing inchoate dignitary rights, the Court maligns real
equal protection rights on the other side of each case. Thus, in crafting
the remedy in Bush to end the statewide recount of ballots,4 the Court
violated a core political equality principle: the right to have one's vote
counted. "The Court did so by refusing to remand the case to the Florida
courts for a recount in accordance with a uniform standard. 45 When the
Court ended the case without a remand, "it essentially decided the presidential election, rather than allowing the decision to be determined by
42. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM
Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore 47-100 (2003).
43. Id. at 142 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
44. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam) ("The Supreme Court of Florida has
said that the legislature intended the State's electors to 'participat[e] fully in the federal electoral

process,' as provided in 3 U.S.C. § 5. That statute, in turn, requires that any controversy or contest
that is designed to lead to a conclusive selection of electors be completed by December 12. That
date is upon us, and there is no recount procedure in place under the State Supreme Court's order

that comports with minimal constitutional standards. Because it is evident that any recount
seeking to meet the December 12 date will be unconstitutional for the reasons we have discussed,
we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida ordering a recount to proceed." (internal
citations omitted)).
45. HASEN, supra note 42, at 84.
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votes cast where the voter's intention was clear." 46
In Purcell, the Court purported to balance the fundamental right to
vote of voters lacking identification against the interest of supposedly
disillusioned voters who "will feel disenfranchised."4 7 Aside from the
fact that the Court offered absolutely no evidence supporting its empirical assertion that voters are deterred from voting out of fear that their
legitimately cast votes will be diluted by those committing voter fraud,48
"the Court offered no explanation why it is appropriate to balance feelings of disenfranchisement against actual disenfranchisements...
Moreover, the Supreme Court did not acknowledge that some voters
might 'feel' disenfranchised when the state imposes barriers on voting
such as a voter identification law without proof that such laws are necessary to deter voter fraud."'4 9
These points dovetail into Gardner's observations about the inherent weakness of the Court's recognition of inchoate dignitary rights. Not
only are such rights ill formed and ill conceived once one properly recognizes the role of voters as part of the democratic process, but the recognition of such rights also has the potential to blind courts to violations
of real political rights that get shunted to second-order status. That the
Court has failed to recognize these violations lends further support to my
argument in Part I that these dignitary rights cases are not rights cases at
all-they are (misguided) structural adjudications aimed at assuring the
proper functioning and allocation of powers and responsibilities in the
electoral process.
CONCLUSION

Professor Gardner has once again shed considerable light on the
Supreme Court's election-law jurisprudence. Through a theoretical
examination of the role of voters in a democratic polity, Gardner has
made a strong case against the recognition of second-order dignitary
rights in cases such as Shaw, Bush, and Purcell. But Gardner has been
wrong to lay the blame for these cases at the feet of those of us who
subscribe to an individual rights view of election-law jurisprudence.
Properly understood, these cases are indefensible on individual rights
grounds: they are really structural cases in disguise.
46. Id.
47. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 3 (2006).
48. Id. (stating that concern about voter fraud "drives honest citizens out of the democratic
process and breeds distrust of our government"). See Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of
Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. RaV. 1, 35 (2007) (criticizing the Court in Purcell for failing to cite any
evidence supporting this conjecture).
49. Hasen, The Untimely Death, supra note 48, at 36 (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:465

For those, like Gardner, subscribing to the structuralist program for
deciding election-law cases, the next task is to show how the Court
applied the wrong structuralist values to these cases and what should
replace it. One place to begin is with Purcell. If I am right that the best
understanding of Purcell is as a structural case designed to keep lastminute election litigation out of the Supreme Court, perhaps Gardnerwho expresses similar concerns in his article 5°-should reconsider and
embrace the case rather than criticize it. If he will not, perhaps he thinks
more of the individual rights approach than he would care to admit.

50. Gardner, supra note 1, at 462 (stating it is "especially damaging" for the Court to inject
itself "at just the point in the electoral process when the need for finality and prompt conferral of a
collective imprimatur of democratic legitimacy is greatest").

